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P-values are widely used in both the social and natural sciences to quantify the statistical
significance of observed results. The recent surge of big data research has made the
p-value an evenmore popular tool to test the significance of a study. However, substantial
literature has been produced critiquing how p-values are used and understood. In this
paper we review this recent critical literature, much of which is routed in the life sciences,
and consider its implications for social scientific research. We provide a coherent picture
of what the main criticisms are, and draw together and disambiguate common themes.
In particular, we explain how the False Discovery Rate (FDR) is calculated, and how
this differs from a p-value. We also make explicit the Bayesian nature of many recent
criticisms, a dimension that is often underplayed or ignored. We conclude by identifying
practical steps to help remediate some of the concerns identified. We recommend that
(i) far lower significance levels are used, such as 0.01 or 0.001, and (ii) p-values are
interpreted contextually, and situated within both the findings of the individual study and
the broader field of inquiry (through, for example, meta-analyses).
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1. INTRODUCTION
P-values are widely used in both the social and natural sciences to quantify the statistical
significance of observed results. Obtaining a p-value that indicates “statistical significance” is often
a requirement for publishing in a top journal. The emergence of computational social science,
which relies mostly on analyzing large scale datasets, has increased the popularity of p-values even
further. However, critics contend that p-values are routinely misunderstood and misused by many
practitioners, and that even when understood correctly they are an ineffective metric: the standard
significance level of 0.05 produces an overall FDR that is far higher, more like 30%. Others argue
that p-values can be easily “hacked” to indicate statistical significance when none exists, and that
they encourage the selective reporting of only positive results.
Considerable research exists into how p-values are (mis)used, [e.g., 1, 2]. In this paper we review
the recent critical literature on p-values, much of which is routed in the life sciences, and consider its
implications for social scientific research.We provide a coherent picture of what themain criticisms
are, and draw together and disambiguate common themes. In particular, we explain how the FDR
is calculated, and how this differs from a p-value. We also make explicit the Bayesian nature of
many recent criticisms. In the final section we identify practical steps to help remediate some of the
concerns identified.
P-values are used in Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) to decide whether to accept
or reject a null hypothesis (which typically states that there is no underlying relationship between
two variables). If the null hypothesis is rejected, this gives grounds for accepting the alternative
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hypothesis (that a relationship does exist between two variables).
The p-value quantifies the probability of observing results at least
as extreme as the ones observed given that the null hypothesis is
true. It is then compared against a pre-determined significance
level (α). If the reported p-value is smaller than α the result
is considered statistically significant. Typically, in the social
sciences α is set at 0.05. Other commonly used significance levels
are 0.01 and 0.001.
In his seminal paper, “The Earth is Round (p < .05)” Cohen
argues that NHST is highly flawed: it is relatively easy to achieve
results that can be labeled significant when a “nil” hypothesis
(where the effect size of H0 is set at zero) is used rather than a
true “null” hypothesis (where the direction of the effect, or even
the effect size, is specified) [3]. This problem is particularly acute
in the context of “big data” exploratory studies, where researchers
only seek statistical associations rather than causal relationships.
If a large enough number of variables are examined, effectively
meaning that a large number of null/alternative hypotheses are
specified, then it is highly likely that at least some “statistically
significant” results will be identified, irrespective of whether
the underlying relationships are truly meaningful. As big data
approaches become more common this issue will become both
far more pertinent and problematic, with the robustness
of many “statistically significant” findings being highly
limited.
Lew argues that the central problem with NHST is reflected
in its hybrid name, which is a combination of (i) hypothesis
testing and (ii) significance testing [4]. In significance testing,
first developed by Ronald Fisher in the 1920s, the p-value
provides an index of the evidence against the null hypothesis.
Originally, Fisher only intended for the p-value to establish
whether further research into a phenomenon could be justified.
He saw it as one bit of evidence to either support or challenge
accepting the null hypothesis, rather than as conclusive evidence
of significance [5; see also 6, 7]. In contrast, hypothesis tests,
developed separately by Neyman and Pearson, replace Fisher’s
subjectivist interpretation of the p-value with a hard and fast
“decision rule”: when the p-value is less than α, the null can
be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. Though this
approach is simpler to apply and understand, a crucial stipulation
of it is that a precise alternative hypothesis must be specified [6].
This means indicating what the expected effect size is (thereby
setting a nil rather than a null hypothesis)—something that most
researchers rarely do [3].
Though hypothesis tests and significance tests are distinct
statistical procedures, and there is much disagreement about
whether they can be reconciled into one coherent framework,
NHST is widely used as a pragmatic amalgam for conducting
research [8, 9]. Hulbert and Lombardi argue that one of the
biggest issues with NHST is that it encourages the use of
terminology such as significant/nonsignificant. This dichotomizes
the p-value on an arbitrary basis, and converts a probability into
a certainty. This is unhelpful when the purpose of using statistics,
as is typically the case in academic studies, is to weigh up evidence
incrementally rather than make an immediate decision [9, p.
315]. Hulbert and Lombardi’s analysis suggests that the real
problem lies not with p-values, but with α and how this has led to
p-values being interpreted dichotomously: too much importance
is attached to the arbitrary cutoff α ≤ 0.05.
2. THE FALSE DISCOVERY RATE
A p-value of 0.05 is normally interpreted to mean that there is
a 1 in 20 chance that the observed results are nonsignificant,
having occurred even though no underlying relationship exists.
Most people then think that the overall proportion of results
that are false positives is also 0.05. However, this interpretation
confuses the p-value (which, in the long run, will approximately
correspond to the type I error rate) with the FDR. The FDR is
what people usually mean when they refer to the error rate: it
is the proportion of reported discoveries that are false positives.
Though 0.05 might seem a reasonable level of inaccuracy, a type
I error rate of 0.05 will likely produce an FDR that is far higher,
easily 30% or more. The formula for FDR is:
False Positives
True Positives+ False Positives
. (1)
Calculating the number of true positives and false positives
requires knowing more than just the type I error rate, but also
(i) the statistical power, or “sensitivity,” of tests and (ii) the
prevalence of effects [10]. Statistical power is the probability
that each test will correctly reject the null hypothesis when the
alternative hypothesis is true. As such, tests with higher power
are more likely to correctly record real effects. Prevalence is
the number of effects, out of all the effects that are tested for,
that actually exist in the real world. In the FDR calculation it
determines the weighting given to the power and the type I error
rate. Low prevalence contributes to a higher FDR as it increases
the likelihood that false positives will be recorded. The calculation
for FDR therefore is:
(1− Prevalence)× Type I error rate
Prevalence× Power+ (1− Prevalence)× Type I error rate
.
(2)
The percentage of reported positives that are actually true is
called the Positive Predictive Value (PPV). The PPV and FDR
are inversely related, such that a higher PPV necessarily means
a lower FDR. To calculate the FDR we subtract the PPV from 1.
If there are no false positives then PPV = 1 and FDR = 0.Table 1
shows how low prevalence of effects, low power, and a high type
I error rate all contribute to a high FDR.
Most estimates of the FDR are surprisingly large; e.g., 50 [1, 11,
12] or 36% [10]. Jager and Leekmore optimistically suggest that it
is just 14% [13]. This lower estimate can be explained somewhat
by the fact that they only use p-values reported in abstracts, and
have a different algorithm to the other studies. Importantly, they
highlight that whilst α is normally set to 0.05, many studies—
particularly in the life sciences—achieve p-values far lower than
this, meaning that the average type I error rate is less than α of
0.05 [13, p. 7]. Counterbalancing this, however, is Colquhoun’s
argument that because most studies are not “properly designed”
(in the sense that treatments are not randomly allocated to groups
and in RCTs assessments are not blinded) statistical power will
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TABLE 1 | Greater prevalence, greater power, and a lower Type I error rate
reduce the FDR.
Prevalence Power Type I error rate FDR
0.01 0.8 0.05 0.86
0.1 0.8 0.05 0.36
0.5 0.8 0.05 0.06
0.1 0.2 0.05 0.69
0.1 0.5 0.05 0.47
0.1 0.8 0.01 0.10
0.1 0.8 0.001 0.01
often be far lower than reported—thereby driving the FDR back
up again [10].
Thus, though difficult to calculate precisely, the evidence
suggests that the FDR of findings overall is far higher than α
of 0.05. This suggests that too much trust is placed in current
research, much of which is wrong far more often than we
think. It is also worth noting that this analysis assumes that
researchers do not intentionally misreport or manipulate results
to erroneously achieve statistical significance. These phenomena,
known as “selective reporting” and “p-hacking,” are considered
separately in Section 4.
3. PREVALENCE AND BAYES
As noted above, the prevalence of effects significantly impacts
the FDR, whereby lower prevalence increases the likelihood
that reported effects are false positives. Yet prevalence is
not controlled by the researcher and, furthermore, cannot be
calculated with any reliable accuracy. There is no way of knowing
objectively what the underlying prevalence of real effects is.
Indeed, the tools by which we might hope to find out this
information (such as NHST) are precisely what have been
criticized in the literature surveyed here. Instead, to calculate
the FDR, prevalence has to be estimated1. In this regard, FDR
calculations are inherently Bayesian as they require the researcher
to quantify their subjective belief about a phenomenon (in this
instance, the underlying prevalence of real effects).
Bayesian theory is an alternative paradigm of statistical
inference to frequentism, of which NHST is part of. Whereas,
frequentists quantify the probability of the data given the null
hypothesis (P(D|H0)), Bayesians calculate the probability of the
hypothesis given the data (P(H1|D)). Though frequentism is far
more widely practiced than Bayesianism, Bayesian inference is
more intuitive: it assigns a probability to a hypothesis based on
how likely we think it to be true.
The FDR calculations outlined above in Section 2 follow
a Bayesian logic. First, a probability is assigned to the prior
likelihood of a result being false (1 − prevalence). Then, new
information (the statistical power and type I error rate) is
incorporated to calculate a posterior probability (the FDR). A
1In much of the recent literature it is assumed that prevalence is very low, around
0.1 or 0.2 [1, 10–12].
common criticism against Bayesian methods such as this is that
they are insufficiently objective as the prior probability is only
a guess. Whilst this is correct, the large number of “findings”
produced each year, as well as the low rates of replicability
[14], suggest that the prevalence of effects is, overall, fairly low.
Another criticism against Bayesian inference is that it is overly
conservative: assigning a low value to the prior probability makes
it more likely that the posterior probability will also be low [15].
These criticisms not withstanding, Bayesian theory offers a useful
way of quantifying how likely it is that research findings are true.
Not all of the authors in the literature reviewed here explicitly
state that their arguments are Bayesian. The reason for this is
best articulated by Colquhoun, who writes that “the description
‘Bayesian’ is not wrong but it is not necessary” [10, p. 5]. The
lack of attention paid to Bayes in Ioannidis’ well-regarded early
article on p-values is particularly surprising given his use of
Bayesian terminology: “the probability that a research finding
is true depends on the prior probability of it being true (before
doing the study)” [1, p. 696]. This perhaps reflects the uncertain
position that Bayesianism holds in most universities, and the
acrimonious nature of its relationship with frequentism [16].
Without commenting on the broader applicability of Bayesian
statistical inference, we argue that a Bayesian methodology has
great utility in assessing the overall credibility of academic
research, and that it has received insufficient attention in previous
studies. Here, we have sought to make visible, and to rectify, this
oversight.
4. PUBLICATION BIAS: SELECTIVE
REPORTING AND P-HACKING
Selective reporting and p-hacking are two types of researcher-
driven publication bias. Selective reporting is where
nonsignificant (but methodologically robust) results are
not reported, often because top journals consider them to be
less interesting or important [17]. This skews the distribution of
reported results toward positive findings, and arguably further
increases the pressure on researchers to achieve statistical
significance. Another form of publication bias, which also
skews results toward positive findings, is called p-hacking.
Head et al. define p-hacking as “when researchers collect or
select data or statistical analyses until nonsignificant results
become significant” [18]. This is direct manipulation of results
so that, whilst they may not be technically false, they are
unrepresentative of the underlying phenomena. See Figure 1 for
a satirical illustration.
Head et al. outline specific mechanisms by which p-values
are intentionally “hacked.” These include: (i) conducting analyse
midway through experiments, (ii) recording many response
variables and only deciding which to report postanalysis, (iii)
excluding, combining, or splitting treatment groups postanalysis,
(iv) including or excluding covariates postanalysis, (v) stopping
data exploration if analysis yields a significant p-value. An
excellent demonstration of how p-values can be hacked by
manipulating the parameters of an experiment is Christie
Aschwanden’s interactive “Hack Your Way to Scientific Glory”
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FIGURE 1 | “Significant”: an illustration of selective reporting and
statistical significance from XKCD. Available online at
http://xkcd.com/882/ (Accessed February 16, 2016).
[19]. This simulator, which analyses whether Republicans or
Democrats being in office affects the US economy, shows how
tests can be manipulated to produce statistically significant
results supporting either parties.
In separate papers, Head et al. [18], and deWinter and Dodou
[20] each examine the distributions of p-values that are reported
in scientific publications in different disciplines. It is reported
that there are considerably more studies reporting alpha just
below the 0.05 significance level than above it (and considerably
more than would be expected given the number of p-values that
occur in other ranges), which suggests that p-hacking is taking
place. This core finding is supported by Jager and Leek’s study on
“significant” publications as well [13].
5. WHAT TO DO
We argued above that a Bayesian approach is useful to estimate
the FDR and assess the overall trustworthiness of academic
findings. However, this does not mean that we also hold that
Bayesian statistics should replace frequentist statistics more
generally in empirical research [see: 21]. In this concluding
section we recommend some pragmatic changes to current
(frequentist) research practices that could lower the FDR and
thus improve the credibility of findings.
Unfortunately, researchers cannot control how prevalent
effects are. They only have direct influence over their study’s α
and its statistical power. Thus, one step to reduce the FDR is to
make the norms for these more rigorous, such as by increasing
the statistical power of studies. We strongly recommend that α of
0.05 is dropped as a convention, and replaced with a far lower α
as standard, such as 0.01 or 0.001; see Table 1. Other suggestions
for improving the quality of statistical significance reporting
include using confidence intervals [7, p. 152]. Some have also
called for researchers to focus more on effect sizes than statistical
significance [22, 23], arguing that statistically significant studies
that have negligible effect sizes should be treated with greater
skepticism. This is of particular importance in the context of big
data studies, where many “statistically significant” studies report
small effect sizes as the association between the dependent and
independent variables is very weak.
Perhaps more important than any specific technical change
in how data is analyzed is the growing consensus that
research processes need to be implemented (and recorded)
more transparently. Nuzzo, for example, argues that “one of the
strongest protections for scientists is to admit everything” [7,
p. 152]. Head et al. also suggest that labeling research as either
exploratory or confirmatory will help readers to interpret the
results more faithfully [18, p. 12]. Weissgerber et al. encourage
researchers to provide “a more complete presentation of data,”
beyond summary statistics [24]. Improving transparency is
particularly important in “big” data-mining studies, given that
the boundary between data exploration (a legitimate exercise)
and p-hacking is often hard to identify, creating significant
potential for intentional or unintentional manipulation of results.
Several commentators have recommended that researchers pre-
register all studies with initiatives such as the Open Science
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Framework [1, 7, 14, 18, 25]. Pre-registering ensures that a record
is kept of the proposed method, effect size measurement, and
what sort of results will be considered noteworthy. Any deviation
from what is initially registered would then need to be justified,
which would give the results greater credibility. Journals could
also proactively assist researchers to improve transparency by
providing platforms on which data and code can be shared, thus
allowing external researchers to reproduce a study’s findings and
trace the method used [18]. This would provide academics with
the practical means to corroborate or challenge previous findings.
Scientific knowledge advances through corroboration and
incremental progress. In keeping with Fisher’s initial view that
p-values should be one part of the evidence used when deciding
whether to reject the null hypothesis, our final suggestion is that
the findings of any single study should always be contextualized
within the broader field of research. Thus, we endorse the view
offered in a recent editorial of Psychological Science that we
should be extra skeptical about studies where (a) the statistical
power is low, (b) the p-value is only slightly below 0.05, and (c)
the result is surprising [14]. Normally, findings are only accepted
once they have been corroborated through multiple studies, and
even in individual studies it is common to “triangulate” a result
with multiple methods and/or data sets. This offers one way
of remediating the problem that even “statistically significant”
results can be false; if multiple studies find an effect then it is more
likely that it truly exists. We therefore, also support the collation
and organization of research findings in meta-analyses as these
enable researchers to quickly evaluate a large range of relevant
evidence.
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